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Abstract
We consider a stochastic differential game in a financial jump dif-
fusion market, where the agent chooses a portfolio which maximizes
the utility of her terminal wealth, while the market chooses a scenario
(represented by a probability measure) which minimizes this maximal
utility. We show that the optimal strategy for the market is to choose
an equivalent martingale measure.
1 Introduction
When pricing derivatives in a financial market (not necessarily complete), it
is common to apply no-arbitrage arguments to show that the price has to
be given by an expectation of the discounted payoff of the derivative, the
expectation taken with respect to some equivalent martingale (or risk free)
measure P0. Such a measure P0 can then be found by using the Girsanov
theorem. However, if the market is incomplete the measure P0 is not unique,
and the no-arbitrage argument gives no information about which measure to
use.
The purpose of this paper is to put the pricing question into the framework
of a stochastic differential game:
We represent the traders by a representative agent with a given utility
function U . This agent is player number 1. Player number 2 is the market
itself. Player number 1 chooses a portfolio which maximizes her expected
1Centre of Mathematics for Applications (CMA) and Department of Mathemat-
ics, University of Oslo, P.O. Box 1053 Blindern, N–0316 Oslo, Norway. E-mail: ok-
sendal@math.uio.no
2Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration, Helleveien 30, N–5045
Bergen, Norway.
3INRIA, Domaine de Voluceau, Roequencourt, B.P. 105, F–78153 Le Chesnay Cedex,
France. Email: Agnes.Sulem@inria.fr
1
discounted utility, the expectation being taken with respect to a probability
measure Q. The measure Q represents the “scenario”, which is chosen by the
market. And the market chooses the scenario which minimizes the maximal
expected utility of the representative agent. This leads to a min-max prob-
lem. We put this problem into a stochastic differential game framework by
representing the market prices by a jump diffusion S(t) and the scenarios by
a parametrized family {Qθ}θ∈Θ of the probability measures. Then we show
that the solution of this game is for the market to choose a risk free measure
Qθˆ and for the agent to put all the money in the risk free asset. Thus the
use of a risk free measure by the market appears as an equilibrium point in
this game.
In the next section we explain this in more detail.
The problem studied in this paper is related to some “worst case scenario”
problems studied in the literature. See e.g. [BMS], [ES], [G], [KM] and [S].
For more information about differential games we refer to [FS], [FlSo], [I] and
[KS]. Our Theorem 2.1 may be regarded as a generalization of Example 3.1
in [MØ], which again is an extension of a result in [PS].
2 The stochastic differential game model
Consider the following jump diffusion market
(risk free asset) dS0(t) = r(t)S0(t)dt; S0(0) = 1(2.1)
(risky asset) dS1(t) = S1(t
−)
[
α(t)dt+ β(t)dB(t)(2.2)
+
∫
R
γ(t, z)N˜(dt, dz)
]
; S1(0) > 0,
where B(t) and N˜(dt, dz) is a Brownian motion and a compensated Poisson
randommeasure, respectively, on a filtered probability space (Ω,F , {Ft}t≥0, P ).
Here r(t), β(t) and γ(t, z) are given Ft-adapted processes, satisfying the fol-
lowing integrability condition:
E
[ T∫
0
{|r(s)|+ |α(s)] + 1
2
β2(s)
+
∫
R
| log(1 + γ(s, z))− γ(s, z)|ν(dz)}ds
]
<∞(2.3)
where T > 0 is a fixed given constant. We also assume that
(2.4) γ(s, z) ≥ −1 for a.a. s, z ∈ [0, T ]× R0,
where R0 = R \ {0}.
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Then it is well-known (see e.g. [ØS, Ch. 1]) that the solution S1(t) of
(2.2) is
S1(t)=S1(0) exp
[ t∫
0
{α(s)− 1
2
β2(s) +
∫
R
(log(1 + γ(s, z))− γ(s, z))ν(dz)}ds
+
t∫
0
β(s)dB(s) +
t∫
0
∫
R
γ(s, z)N˜(ds, dz)
]
; t ∈ [0, T ].(2.5)
We now introduce a family M of measures Qθ parametrized by processes
θ = (θ0(t), θ1(t, z)) such that
(2.6) dQθ(ω) = Zθ(T )dP (ω) on FT ,
where
(2.7)
dZθ(t) = Zθ(t
−)[−θ0(t)dB(t)−
∫
R
θ1(t, z)N˜(dt, dz)]; 0 ≤ t ≤ T
Zθ(0) = 1.
We assume that
θ1(t, z) ≤ 1 for a.a. t, z, ω and(2.8)
T∫
0
{θ20(s) +
∫
R
θ21(s, z)ν(dz}ds <∞ a.s.(2.9)
Then the solution of (2.7) is given by
Zθ(t) = exp
[
−
t∫
0
θ0(s)dB(s)− 12
t∫
0
θ20(s)ds
+
t∫
0
∫
R
log(1− θ1(s, z))N˜(ds, dz)
+
t∫
0
∫
R
{log(1− θ1(s, z)) + θ1(s, z)}ν(dz)ds
]
; 0 ≤ t ≤ T(2.10)
If
(2.11) E[Zθ(T )] = 1
then Qθ(Ω) = 1, i.e. Qθ is a probability measure.
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If, in addition, θ0(t) and θ1(t, z) satisfy the equation
(2.12) β(t)θ0(t) +
∫
R
γ(t, z)θ1(t, z)ν(dz) = α(t)− r(t); t ∈ [0, T ]
then the measure Qθ is an equivalent local martingale measure. See e.g. [ØS,
Ch. 1].
We do not assume a priori that (2.12) holds. The set of all θ = (θ0, θ1)
such that (2.8)–(2.11) hold is denoted by Θ. These are the admissible controls
of the market.
Next we introduce a portfolio in this market, represented by the fraction
pi(t) of the wealth invested in the risky asset at time t. We assume that pi(t)
is self-financing, which means that the corresponding wealth process X(pi)(t)
will have the dynamics
dX(pi)(t) = X(pi)(t−)
[
{r(t) + (α(t)− r(t))pi(t)}dt
+ β(t)pi(t)dB(t) + pi(t)
∫
R
γ(t, z)N˜(dt, dz)
]
; X(pi)(0) = x > 0.(2.13)
We assume that pi(t)γ(t, z) ≥ −1 a.s. and
T∫
0
{|r(s)|+ |α(s)− r(s)| |pi(s)|+ β2(s)pi2(s)
+ pi2(s)
∫
R
γ2(s, z)ν(dz)}ds <∞ a.s.(2.14)
Then the solution of (2.13) is
X(pi)(t) = x exp
[ t∫
0
{r(s) + (α(s)− r(s))pi(s)− 1
2
β2(s)pi2(s)
+
∫
R
(ln(1 + pi(s)γ(s, z))− pi(s)γ(s, z))ν(dz)}ds
+
t∫
0
pi(s)β(s)dB(s) +
t∫
0
∫
R
ln(1 + pi(s)γ(s, z))N˜(ds, dz)
]
; t ≥ 0(2.15)
The set of portfolios above is denoted by A. Fix a utility function U :
[0,∞)→ [−∞,∞), assumed to be increasing, concave and twice continuously
differentiable on (0,∞).
Consider the following stochastic differential game between the represen-
tative agent and the market : Given the scenario represented by the measure
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Qθ, the agent chooses the portfolio which maximizes the Qθ-expected utility
of her terminal wealth. The market reacts to this choice by choosing the
scenario Qθ which minimizes this maximal expected utility. This can be ex-
pressed as the zero-sum stochastic differential game to find Φ(s, y1, y2) and
θ∗ ∈ Θ, pi∗ ∈ A such that
(2.16) Φ(s, y1, y2)= inf
θ∈Θ
(
sup
pi∈A
EQθ [U(X
(pi)(T−s))]
)
=EQθ∗ [U(X
(pi∗)(T−s))].
Here s = Y0(0), y1 = Y1(0), y2 = Y2(0) are the initial values of the process
Y (t) = Y θ,pi(t) ∈ R3 given by
dY (t) =
dY0(t)dY1(t)
dY2(t)
 =
 dtdZθ(t)
dX(pi)(t)
 = (dt, dZθ(t), dX(pi)(t))T
= (1, 0, X(t)[r(t) + (α(t)− r(t))pi(t)])Tdt
+ (0,−θ0(t)Zθ(t), X(t)pi(t)β(t))TdB(t)
+
∫
R
(0,−Zθ(t−)θ1(t, z), X(t−)pi(t)γ(t, z))T N˜(dt, dz).(2.17)
We assume from now on that r(t) is deterministic and that α(t) = α(Y (t)),
β(t) = β(Y (t)), γ(t, z) = γ(Y (t), z), pi(t) = pi(Y (t)) and θ(t) = (θ0(Y (t)),
θ1(Y (t), z)) are Markovian. Thus we identify pi with a map pi : R3 → R and
we identify θ with a map θ = (θ0, θ1(·)) : R3 → R× RR (feedback controls).
Then Y θ,pi(t) is a Markov process with generator Aθ,pi given by
Aθ,piϕ(s, y1, y2) =
∂ϕ
∂s
+ y2(r + (α− r)pi) ∂ϕ∂y2
+ 1
2
θ20y
2
1
∂2ϕ
∂y21
+ 1
2
y22pi
2β2 ∂
2ϕ
∂y22
− θ0piy1y2β ∂2ϕ∂y1∂y2
+
∫
R
{
ϕ(s, y1 − y1θ1(·, z), y2 + y2piγ(·, z))− ϕ(s, y1, y2)
+ y1θ1(·, z) ∂ϕ∂y1 − y2piγ(·, z)
∂ϕ
∂y2
}
ν(dz) for ϕ ∈ C1,2,2(R3).(2.18)
To solve the problem (2.16) we apply the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB)
equation for stochastic differential games given in [MØ]. Applied to our
setting this HJB gets the following form:
Theorem 2.1 ([MØ]) Put S = (0, T )× (0,∞)× (0,∞), y = (y0, y1, y2) =
(s, y1, y2). Suppose there exists a function ϕ ∈ C2(S) ∩ C(S¯) and a Markov
control (θˆ(y), pˆi(y))) ∈ Θ×A such that
(i) Aθ,pˆi(y)ϕ(y) ≥ 0 for all θ ∈ R× RR, y ∈ S
(ii) Aθˆ(y),piϕ(y) ≤ 0 for all pi ∈ R, y ∈ S
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(iii) Aθˆ(y),pˆi(y)ϕ(y) = 0 for all y ∈ S
(iv) lim
t→T−
ϕ(Y θ,pi(t)) = Y θ,pi1 (T )U(Y
θ,pi
2 (T ))
(v) the family { ϕ(Y θ,pi(τ))}τ∈T is uniformly integrable for all y ∈ S, where
T is the set of stopping times τ ≤ T .
Then, with Jθ,pi(y) = EQθ [U(X
(pi)(T − s))],
ϕ(y) = Φ(y) = inf
θ∈Θ
(
sup
pi∈Π
Jθ,pi(y)
)
= sup
pi∈Π
(
inf
θ∈Θ
Jθ,pi(y)
)
= sup
pi∈Π
J θˆ,pi(y) = inf
θ∈Θ
Jθ,pˆi(y) = J θˆ,pˆi(y); y ∈ S
and (θˆ, pˆi) is an optimal (Markov) control.
We guess that ϕ has the form
(2.19) ϕ(s, y1, y2) = y1U(f(s)y2)
for some deterministic function f with f(T ) = 1 (motivated by (iv)).
Note that conditions (i)–(iii) in Theorem 2.1 can be written
inf
θ
Aθ,pˆiϕ(y) = Aθˆ,pˆiϕ(y) = 0
and
sup
pi
Aθˆ,piϕ(y) = Aθˆ,pˆiϕ(y) = 0.
Maximizing Aθˆ,piϕ(s, y1, y2) over all pi gives the following first order condition
for a maximum point pˆi:
y2(α− r(s))y1U ′(f(s)y2)f(s) + y22pˆiβ2(y)y1U ′′(f(s)y2)f 2(s)
− θˆ0y1y2β(y)U ′(f(s)y2)f(s)
+
∫
R
{(y1 − y1θˆ1(y, z))U ′(f(s)(y2 + y2pˆiγ(y, z)))f(s)y2γ(y, z)
− y2γ(y, z)y1U ′(f(s)y2)f(s)}ν(dz) = 0,
i.e.
(α− r(s))U ′(f(s)y2) + y2pˆiβ2(y)U ′′(f(s)y2)f(s)− θˆ0β(y)U ′(f(s)y2)
+
∫
R
{(1− θˆ1(y, z))U ′(f(s)y2(1 + pˆiγ(y, z)))
− U ′(f(s)y2)}γ(y, z)ν(dz) = 0.(2.20)
6
We then minimize Aθ,pˆiϕ(s, y1, y2) over all θ = (θ0, θ1) and get the following
first order conditions for a minimum point θˆ = (θˆ0, θˆ1):
(2.21) −pˆiy1y2β(y)U ′(f(s)y2)f(s) = 0
and
(2.22)
∫
R
{−y1U(f(s)y2(1 + pˆiγ(y, z))) + y1U(f(s)y2)}ν(dz) = 0.
From (2.21) we conclude that
(2.23) pˆi = 0,
which substituted into (2.20) gives
(α− r(s))U ′(f(s)y2)− θˆ0β(y)U ′(f(s)y2)
+
∫
R
{−θˆ1(y, z)γ(y, z)U ′(f(s)y2)}ν(dz) = 0
or
(2.24) θˆ0(y)β(y) +
∫
R
θˆ1(y, z)γ(y, z)ν(dz) = α(y)− r(s).
The HJB equation for stochastic differential games states that with these
values of pˆi and θˆ we should have
Aθˆ,pˆiϕ(s, y1, y2) = 0
i.e.
y1U
′(f(s)y2)y2f ′(s) + y2r(s)y1U ′(f(s)y2)f(s)
+
∫
R
{y1(1− θ1(y, z))U(f(s)y2)− y1U(f(s)y2)
+ y1θˆ1U(f(s)y2)}ν(dz) = 0
or
f ′(s) + r(s)f(s) = 0
i.e.
(2.25) f(s) = exp
( T−s∫
0
r(u)du
)
.
We have proved:
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Theorem 2.2 Let U ∈ C([0,∞)) ∩ C1((0,∞)) be concave and increasing.
Then the solution of the stochastic differential game (2.16) is for the agent
to choose the portfolio
(2.26) pi(t) = pˆi(t) = 0
(i.e. to put all the wealth in the risk free asset) and for the market to choose
the scenario Qθˆ where θˆ = (θˆ0, θˆ1) satisfies the equation
(2.27) θˆ0(Y (t))β(Y (t)) +
∫
R
θˆ1(Y (t), z)γ(Y (t), z)ν(dz) = α(Y (t))− r(t).
In other words, the market chooses an equivalent martingale measure (or
risk free measure) Qθˆ.
Remark 2.3 Note that there is no no-arbitrage principle used in this pa-
per. In stead, the choice of a scenario represented by an equivalent martingale
measure is deduced as an equilibrium state of a game between a representa-
tive agent and the market.
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